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INTRODUCTION 
Antitrust is having a moment.  Commentators and policymakers, both 
progressive and conservative, are calling for increased antitrust 
enforcement to address all manner of social ills.  From technology 
platforms’ power over speech1 and encroachments on user privacy,2 to 
wage stagnation in more concentrated labor markets,3 to competition-
softening from ever-larger index funds,4 to growing income inequality,5 
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 1. See, e.g., Donald Trump, Jr., Free Speech Suppression Online Builds Case to Break Up Big 
Tech, THE HILL (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/463631-free 
-speech-suppression-online-builds-case-to-break-up-big-tech [https://perma.cc/P9YG-VC8X] (“Free 
speech is under attack by the Big Tech monopolies that dominate the internet.”).  
 2. See, e.g., Dina Srinivasan, Why Privacy Is an Antitrust Issue, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/opinion/privacy-antitrust-facebook.html [https://perma.cc 
/ZT7Y-DDV3] (“This is how Facebook usurped our privacy: with the help of its market dominance.  
The price of using Facebook has stayed the same over the years (it’s free to join and use), but the cost 
of using it, calculated in terms of the amount of data that users now must provide, is an order of 
magnitude above what it was when Facebook faced real competition.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger & Eric Posner, Corporate America Is Suppressing Wages for Many 
Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/opinion/corporate 
-america-suppressing-wages.html [https://perma.cc/GR4A-STF6] (“The culprit is ‘monopsony 
power.’  This term is used by economists to refer to the ability of an employer to suppress wages below 
the efficient or perfectly competitive level of compensation.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Eric Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & Glen Weyl, A Monopoly Donald Trump Can 
Pop, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/opinion/a-monopoly-donald 
-trump-can-pop.html [https://perma.cc/64ZR-6FR9] (“The great, but mostly unknown, antitrust story 
of our time is the astonishing rise of the institutional investor—a large company, like a mutual fund 
company, insurance company, pension fund or asset management firm, that buys stock in substantial 
quantities for the benefit of clients and customers—and the challenge that it poses to market 
competition.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 
104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 14 (2015) (“Concerns with inequality can implicate antitrust and competition 
policy in two general ways.  First, in that market power contributes to inequality, more aggressive 
antitrust enforcement might play a remedial role.  Second, antitrust enforcers and regulatory agencies 
such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) might make reducing the effects of inequality 
a high priority in developing enforcement and regulatory initiatives.”). 
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reduced innovation,6 and threats to democracy itself7—the list of maladies 
for which antitrust has been proposed as a remedy goes on and on. 
Antitrust enforcers have taken note.  From Fall 2018 through Spring 
2019, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) held fourteen hearings 
on “Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century.”8  The 
FTC considered such diverse topics as common ownership by institutional 
investors, labor market monopsony, consumer privacy, effects of “big 
data,” predatory and exclusionary tactics of technology platforms, 
algorithms and artificial intelligence, and vertical mergers.9  In Summer 
2019, the FTC joined the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) in announcing probes of Google, Apple, Facebook, and 
Amazon (colloquially referred to as GAFA).10  And the action is not 
limited to the federal level; more than forty-six state attorneys general have 
joined the fray with their own investigations of Facebook (led by 
Democrat Letitia James of New York)11 and Google (led by Republican 
Ken Paxton of Texas).12 
In light of policymakers’ heightened interest in antitrust and the recent 
flurry of bipartisan enforcement activity, it is worth stepping back to ask a 
couple of big-picture questions: What are antitrust’s limits in addressing 
the social harms that are motivating calls for more aggressive 
enforcement?  And how should enforcers and courts proceed in light of 
 
 6. See, e.g., Derek Thompson, America’s Monopoly Problem: How Big Business Jammed the 
Wheels of Innovation, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive 
/2016/10/americas-monopoly-problem/497549/ [https://perma.cc/X728-3Q6X] (“This decline in 
dynamism has coincided with the rise of extraordinarily large and profitable firms that look 
discomfortingly like the monopolies and oligopolies of the 19th century.”).   
 7. See Ganesh Sitaraman, Unchecked Power: How Monopolies Have Flourished—and 
Undermined Democracy, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 29, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/152294 
/unchecked-power [https://perma.cc/LUS7-HRFU] (“When economic power is concentrated, it 
destroys not only economic freedom but also political freedom, as the wealthy and powerful use their 
resources to capture the government and rig it in their favor.”).  See generally TIM WU, THE CURSE 
OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018) [hereinafter WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS].  
 8. FED. TRADE COMM’N, Hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st 
Century, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/hearings-competition-consumer-protection [https://perma.cc 
/M2LA-6DBK] (last visited Apr. 13, 2020).  
 9. See id. (cataloguing hearing topics). 
 10. See Brent Kendall, Justice Department to Open Broad, New Antitrust Review of Big Tech 
Companies, WALL STREET J. (July 23, 2019, 5:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice 
-department-to-open-broad-new-antitrust-review-of-big-tech-companies-11563914235 [https:// 
perma.cc/T5GM-7PLF]; Brian Fung, FTC Ramping Up Its Big Tech Antitrust Investigations, CNN 
BUS. (Sept. 11, 2019, 2:53 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/11/tech/ftc-big-tech-antitrust 
-investigations/index.html [https://perma.cc/RKG9-FVBH].  
 11. Tony Room, Forty-Six Attorneys General Have Joined a New York-Led Antitrust 
Investigation of Facebook, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2019, 12:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/technology/2019/10/22/forty-six-attorneys-general-have-joined-new-york-led-antitrust-investigation 
-into-facebook [https://perma.cc/L775-68D7]. 
 12. Lauren Feiner, Google Faces a New Antitrust Probe by 50 Attorneys General, CNBC (Sept. 
9, 2019 2:05 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/09/texas-attorney-general-leads-google-antitrust 
-probe.html [https://perma.cc/CVA6-UPVU].  
2020] THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1099 
those limits? 
These questions are not new.  In 1984, Judge (then Professor) Frank 
Easterbrook addressed them in an article entitled The Limits of Antitrust.13  
Few antitrust articles—or law review articles generally—have had the 
influence of that writing.  Cited over 650 times in law journals,14 its central 
idea appears to underlie most of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent antitrust 
decisions.15 
This Article revisits The Limits of Antitrust in light of the current 
antitrust moment.  Part I describes the central components of 
Easterbrook’s 1984 proposal and considers, for each, whether and how it 
should be revised in light of subsequent market developments and 
advances in economic learning.  Part I concludes that Easterbrook’s 
overarching prescription for maximizing antitrust’s effectiveness remains 
fundamentally sound but that his view about the relative harms from over- 
and under-enforcement, as well as some of the specific screening 
mechanisms he proposed for optimizing antitrust’s effectiveness, require 
some adjustment. 
Part II then builds upon Easterbrook’s approach by proposing four 
new screening mechanisms that could assist twenty-first century courts 
and enforcers in ensuring that antitrust secures as much social welfare as 
possible, given its intrinsic limitations.  The proposed screening 
mechanisms would limit antitrust intervention to situations in which the 
complained of conduct (1) causes or threatens harm to consumers, (2) 
extends market power, (3) is unlikely to be addressed by other bodies of 
law or privately ordered solutions, and (4) does not involve a remedy 
requiring a great deal of information or endowing government officials 
with substantial discretionary authority. 
I. ASSESSING THE LIMITS OF ANTITRUST 
We begin with a summary of The Limits of Antitrust16 and then turn to 
assess the merits of its prescriptions in light of twenty-first century 
developments. 
 
 13. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
 14. A Westlaw search of “Law Reviews and Journals” lists 654 articles citing Easterbrook’s 
article as of April 10, 2020.  
 15. See Thomas A. Lambert & Alden F. Abbott, Recognizing the Limits of Antitrust: The Roberts 
Court Versus the Enforcement Agencies, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 791, 793 (2015) (“[T]he 
federal judiciary—in particular, the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts—has 
largely endorsed Easterbrook’s limits of antitrust approach.”); Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court 
and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV. 871, 871–74 (2011) (noting the current U.S. Supreme 
Court’s treatment of antitrust cases).  
 16. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 13. 
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A. Three Central Components of The Limits of Antitrust 
The approach set forth in The Limits of Antitrust included three 
components.  Judge Easterbrook set forth an overarching objective for 
antitrust courts and enforcers, offered advice on how to weigh different 
costs in making intervention decisions, and posited a set of specific 
screening mechanisms that would help achieve antitrust’s overarching 
goal.17 
1. The Overarching Objective 
To understand the objective Easterbrook posited for antitrust courts 
and enforcers, it may help to consider antitrust’s “domain”—i.e., the type 
of activity it regulates.  Antitrust is concerned with business behaviors that 
generate market power: coordinated conduct that leads to collusion18 and 
exclusionary actions that create monopoly power.19  The difficulty is that 
many acts of coordination between firms enhance market output, and 
many business practices that usurp business from the actor’s rivals—and 
thus “exclude” them from the market—also generate benefits for 
consumers.  For example, resale price maintenance may facilitate 
collusion but may also encourage dealer-provided services by preventing 
free-riding;20  manufacturers’ exclusive dealing agreements may raise 
rivals’ costs of distribution but may also spur manufacturer investment in 
distributors by reducing interbrand free-riding;21 extremely low prices 
may drive rivals from the market, but they offer an obvious and immediate 
benefit to consumers.22  These are typical of the behaviors antitrust 
addresses: they involve both upsides and downsides, and thus may be, on 
 
 17. See generally id. 
 18. Such conduct is policed by Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (forbidding 
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade), and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018) 
(forbidding anticompetitive mergers). 
 19. Such actions are policed by Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) (forbidding 
monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize), and Section 3 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018) (forbidding exclusive dealing and tying arrangements that reduce 
market competition). 
 20. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–94 (2007) 
(cataloguing potential pro- and anti-competitive effects of minimum resale price maintenance). 
 21. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, Procompetitive Justifications for Exclusive 
Dealing: Preventing Free-Riding and Creating Incentives for Undivided Dealer Loyalty, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE (draft Nov. 12, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/atr/procompetitive-justifications 
-exclusive-dealing-preventing-free-riding-and-creating-undivided#2 [https://perma.cc/LE2G-CXPF] 
(explaining that exclusive dealing may be used to prevent free-riding in certain cases, such as the 
standard case where dealers use promotional assets supplied by the manufacturer to sell rival 
products). 
 22. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–26 (1993) 
(discussing benefits and potential competitive concerns from extremely low prices and setting liability 
rules to avoid squelching consumer benefits). 
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net, either output-enhancing (procompetitive) or output-reducing 
(anticompetitive).  They are, in short, mixed bags. 
Regulating competitive mixed bags inevitably entails costs.23  First, 
there are the costs that result from mistaken judgments.24  If the regulator 
wrongly allows conduct that is, on net, anticompetitive, consumers will 
face higher prices and/or reduced quality, and a deadweight loss will 
occur.25  But if the regulator wrongly forbids conduct that is, on balance, 
procompetitive, market output will be lower than it otherwise would be 
and, again, consumers will suffer.26  Both false convictions (Type I errors) 
and false acquittals (Type II errors) generate losses.27 
In addition to these so-called error costs, regulating competitive mixed 
bags entails significant costs of simply deciding whether contemplated or 
actual conduct is forbidden or permitted.28  Such “decision costs” must be 
borne by business planners (who are attempting to avoid liability), by 
litigating parties (who are trying to prove their case), and by adjudicators 
(who must decide whether the law has been broken). 
Type I error costs, Type II error costs, and decision costs are 
intertwined.29  If policymakers try to reduce the risk of false conviction 
(Type I error) by making it harder for a plaintiff to establish liability or 
easier for a defendant to make out a defense, they will increase the risk of 
false acquittal (Type II error).30  If they ease a plaintiff’s burden or cut 
back on available defenses to reduce false acquittals, they will tend to 
enhance the social losses from false convictions.31  And if they make the 
rule more nuanced in an effort to condemn the bad without chilling the 
good, thereby reducing error costs overall, they enhance decision costs.32  
As in a game of whack-a-mole, driving down costs in one area will cause 
them to rise elsewhere. 
In light of antitrust’s inevitable and intertwined costs of error and 
 
 23. Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 4 (“Antitrust is costly.  The judges act with imperfect 
information about the effects of the practices at stake.  The costs of action and information are the 
limits of antitrust.”). 
 24. These are Easterbrook’s “costs of action.”  See id. at 21 (“The costs of judicial error are borne 
by consumers, who lose the efficient practices and get nothing in return.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. These are Easterbrook’s “costs of . . . information.”  Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 4.  
Easterbrook explains, “The traditional Rule of Reason falls prey to all of the limits of antitrust. It 
assumes that judges can tap a fount of economic knowledge that does not exist, and it disregards the 
costs of judicial decisionmaking (including the costs of damning efficient conduct by mistake or 
design).”  Id. at 39.  
 29. See THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 10–12 (2017) 
(explaining the differences and similarities between Type I and Type II error costs). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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decision—what he called, collectively, the “limits of antitrust”33—
Easterbrook proposed an overarching goal for antitrust policies: They 
should be crafted so as to minimize the sum of error and decision costs.34  
Pursuing such an objective, policymakers would not try to prevent every 
anticompetitive act, allow every procompetitive one, or keep antitrust 
rules as simple as possible.  In keeping with Voltaire’s prudent maxim, 
“the perfect is the enemy of the good,”35 they would eschew perfection 
along any single dimension in favor of overall optimization.  This would 
ensure that antitrust, despite its limits, accomplishes as much good as 
possible. 
2. The Notion of Incommensurate Harms 
The second key component of Easterbrook’s Limits of Antitrust was 
his instruction about how to weigh Type I versus Type II errors.36  If a 
procompetitive behavior is wrongly condemned (Type I error), the adverse 
effect—squandered efficiencies—is not limited to the defendant’s market 
but, because of the precedent created, extends to other markets in which 
the condemned practice is or would be utilized.37  Moreover, correcting 
the erroneous precedent and resulting welfare loss requires a judicial 
decision that overrules the mistaken condemnation.38  By contrast, if 
anticompetitive conduct is wrongly allowed to persist, the result will be 
the sort of monopoly pricing that invites entry and may thereby self-
correct.39  Accordingly, Easterbrook reasoned, false convictions are 
“worse” than false acquittals.40  And that suggests, he argued, that liability 
rules on questionable practices should be calibrated so as to err in the 
 
 33. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 34. Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 16 (“The legal system should be designed to minimize the total 
costs of (1) anticompetitive practices that escape condemnation; (2) competitive practices that are 
condemned or deterred; and (3) the system itself.”). 
 35. Voltaire, La Begueule, in 3 RECUEIL DES MEILLEURS CONTES EN VERS 412, 412 (1772) 
(“[L]e mieux est ennemi du bien . . . .”). 
 36. Easterbrook explained: 
A fundamental difficulty facing the court is the incommensurability of the stakes.  If the 
court errs by condemning a beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good.  Any 
other firm that uses the condemned practice faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no 
matter the benefits.  If the court errs by permitting a deleterious practice, though, the 
welfare loss decreases over time.  Monopoly is self-destructive.  Monopoly prices 
eventually attract entry.  True, this long run may be a long time coming, with loss to society 
in the interim.  The central purpose of antitrust is to speed up the arrival of the long run.  
But this should not obscure the point: judicial errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-
correcting while erroneous condemnations are not. 
Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 2–3. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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direction of allowing anticompetitive acts rather than banning or 
discouraging procompetitive ones.41 
The U.S. Department of Justice seemingly endorsed Easterbrook’s 
incommensurate harms position in its now-abrogated Section 2 Report, 
which suggested that exclusionary unilateral conduct not subject to one of 
the more tailored liability rules in the Report should be condemned only if 
its likely anticompetitive harm would be “substantially disproportionate” 
to its likely procompetitive benefit.42 
3. The Screening Mechanisms 
If the overall goal is to implement antitrust so as to minimize the sum 
of error and decision costs, with an understanding that Type I errors 
typically impose greater costs than Type II errors, how should courts 
proceed?  The third key component of Easterbrook’s approach was a set 
of screening mechanisms designed to help antitrust courts achieve the 
overarching objective by filtering out challenges to practices that are likely 
to be procompetitive.  Specifically, Easterbrook proposed five filters: 
1. Market Power.  The court should ask whether the defendant (or 
group of defendants) has market power.  If not, Easterbrook 
asserted, the challenged conduct is unlikely to create 
anticompetitive harm and should not be condemned.43 
2. Logical Relation Between Profit and Reduced Competition.  The 
court should ask whether the challenged conduct would increase 
the defendant’s profits by reducing competition.  If the alleged 
reduction in competition would reduce the defendant’s profits, 
there is no need for antitrust to deter the anticompetitive behavior; 
 
 41. See id. at 15 (“In which direction should these rules err?  For a number of reasons, errors on 
the side of excusing questionable practices are preferable.”); see also id. (“[T]he economic system 
corrects monopoly more readily than it corrects judicial errors.”).   
 42. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER 
SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 45 (2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr 
/legacy/2009/05/11/236681.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVC3-FRJ5] (“Under the disproportionality test, 
conduct that potentially has both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects is anticompetitive under 
section 2 if its likely anticompetitive harms substantially outweigh its likely procompetitive 
benefits.”).  The Department of Justice later withdrew the report.  See Christine A. Varney, Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks Before the United States Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous 
Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era (May 12, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech 
/vigorous-antitrust-enforcement-challenging-era [https://perma.cc/4JG6-U4XC]) (“I have withdrawn 
the Section 2 Report by the Department of Justice. Effective May 11, 2009, the Section 2 Report no 
longer represents the policy of the Department of Justice with regard to antitrust enforcement under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Report and its conclusions should not be used as guidance by 
courts, antitrust practitioners, and the business community.”). 
 43. Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 19–23. 
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the market will do so.44  Moreover, if the challenged practice could 
enhance the defendant’s profits even apart from a reduction in 
competition, condemnation of the practice could deter 
procompetitive conduct.45 
3. Widespread Adoption of Identical Vertical Practices.  For vertical 
practices like resale price maintenance (RPM), exclusive dealing, 
and tying, the court should ask whether “almost all firms in [the 
defendant’s] industry use the same vertical restraints.”46  The 
reason for this filter, Easterbrook said, “is that every one of the 
potentially-anticompetitive outcomes of vertical arrangements 
depends on the uniformity of the practice.”47  Easterbrook offered 
RPM as an example, observing that the potential anticompetitive 
harms from the practice—facilitation of dealer or manufacturer 
cartels—can occur only if the practice is widely deployed.48  Where 
a vertical practice is used by just one or a few competitors in an 
industry, Easterbrook reasoned, it is likely employed for 
procompetitive ends.49 
4. Effect on Output and Market Share.  The court should ask whether 
the defendant’s output and market share are falling.50  If the 
challenged practice results in a better deal for consumers—perhaps 
by enhancing the quality of the defendant’s offering by enough to 
offset any price increase—then the defendant’s output and market 
share will grow.51  By contrast, if the practice is enhancing the 
 
 44. Id. at 24 (“Unless there is a link between the antitrust injury and the defendant’s profit, there 
is no need for judges to impose a sanction.  The sanction imposed by the business losses will clear up 
the practice in due course.”). 
 45. Id. at 28–29 (explaining how a period of below-cost pricing could enhance the seller’s profits 
even apart from a reduction in competition and asserting that “an antitrust court should handle cases 
such as this by asking whether profits depended on monopoly”). 
 46. Id. at 30. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  Easterbrook explained: 
[R]esale price maintenance (RPM) or territorial restraints can facilitate or enforce a cartel 
only if all firms in the industry use identical practices.  If Sylvania uses RPM while GE 
and Sony do not, the RPM cannot facilitate anyone’s cartel.  Dealers that want to cheat on 
a dealers’ cartel will sell more GE sets at reduced prices, [a]nd if practices are not identical 
in the manufacturing industry, then RPM cannot facilitate a cartel there, either.  The whole 
point of a “facilitating practice” is that when everyone does things the same way, this 
reduces the number of things the cartel must monitor to control cheating.  When everyone 
does not do things the same way, nothing can be “facilitated.”  
Id.  
 49. Id. at 31 (“Whatever explains a solitary manufacturer’s use of RPM, exclusive contracts, ties, 
or other practices, the practice cannot be anticompetitive.”). 
 50. Id. (“If arrangements are anticompetitive, the output and market share of those using them 
must fall.”). 
 51. Id. (“If [the defendant firm] both increases the price and increases the quality, it may sell 
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defendant’s market power, its output will fall; the monopolist 
enhances its profits by reducing output so as to drive up price.  
Thus, Easterbrook reasoned, trends in the defendant’s output and 
market share can signal whether its conduct is, on balance, pro- or 
anti-competitive.52 
5. The Identity of the Plaintiff.  Finally, the court should ask whether 
the plaintiff is a customer or a competitor of the defendant.53  
Customers benefit from enhanced competition in the defendant’s 
market, as when a defendant gains a cost- or quality-advantage over 
its rivals; customers are harmed by reductions in competition.  By 
contrast, competitors are injured when a defendant’s conduct gives 
it a cost- or quality-advantage, and they benefit when market 
competition eases.  A customer plaintiff, then, is likely 
complaining about reduced competition—antitrust’s target—
whereas a competitor plaintiff may be complaining of enhanced 
competition or may be seeking to raise the defendant’s cost (and 
thereby secure its own cost-advantage) by forcing it to defend a 
lawsuit.54  The identity of the complaining party, then, can assist 
courts in determining whether a challenged practice is likely pro- 
or anti-competitive. 
B. Evaluating the Approach Today 
More than thirty-five years have passed since Easterbook published 
The Limits of Antitrust.  During that time, there have been some major 
developments in the business world, including, among many others, the 
advent of the Internet and mobile telephony, the rise of digital social 
networks and other digital platforms, and, in the world of finance, 
explosive growth in index investing.  There have also been significant 
advances in economic learning, with scholars gaining a better 
understanding of how certain business practices can be pro- and/or anti-
competitive.  How does Easterbrook’s late-twentieth century approach 
look in light of twenty-first century market developments and advances in 
economic learning? 
Easterbrook’s overarching objective for antitrust policy decisions 
remains fundamentally sound.  Since 1984, no developments in market 
 
more or less, depending on whether consumers value the improvement at more than the cost. . . .  If 
its sales increase despite the higher price, we know that the change was worth the higher price, and 
then some, to consumers.”). 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. at 33–39. 
 54. As Easterbook observed, the costs of antitrust litigation are usually significantly greater for 
defendants than for plaintiffs.  Id. at 34. 
1106 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
structures or economic learning have altered the mixed-bag nature of the 
behavior antitrust regulates, the consequent inevitability of error and 
decision costs, or the fact that efforts to reduce one set of costs will drive 
up another.  Scholars have progressed in their understanding of the 
circumstances under which particular behaviors may occasion 
anticompetitive harm (or create procompetitive benefits), and that new 
knowledge may allow courts to restructure doctrines so as to reduce costs 
overall.55  But antitrust remains an inherently limited enterprise, and 
Easterbrook’s overarching prescription for maximizing welfare in light of 
those limits—craft policies to minimize the sum of error and decision 
costs—remains as wise as ever. 
Easterbrook’s instruction on the incommensurate harms from Type I 
versus Type II errors has fared less well.  The claim that false convictions 
are systematically worse than false acquittals is too categorical.56  It is true 
that many anticompetitive harms are self-correcting.  Collusion among 
competitors, for example, is difficult to maintain and invites entry.  
Economic learning has revealed, though, that some forms of exclusionary 
conduct do not automatically self-correct.  For example, some actions by 
a dominant firm—e.g., exclusive dealing that forecloses a manufacturer’s 
competitors from a substantial proportion of available distribution 
outlets—can prevent rivals from growing enough to attain the scale 
economies that would enable them to underprice the dominant firm.57 
Indeed, in markets characterized by large economies of scale and 
network effects (e.g., digital social networking, computer operating 
systems), entry and underpricing may be particularly unlikely.58  
Easterbrook’s point about incommensurate harms should thus be 
somewhat softened: in deciding whether to tilt the liability rule in favor of 
permitting questionable conduct, courts should ask whether any resulting 
market power would be transitory (as with collusion) or durable (as with 
some exclusionary practices in some types of markets).  Sometimes a pro-
defendant bias will be appropriate, but not always.59 
Like his instruction on incommensurate harms, Easterbrook’s 
 
 55. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–94 (2007) 
(summarizing economic learning on competitive effects of minimum resale price maintenance). 
 56. See generally Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 
(2010) (arguing that the current role of error analysis in United States antitrust law is too simplistic).  
 57. See Joshua D. Wright, Moving Beyond Naïve Foreclosure Analysis, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1163, 1166–71 (2012). 
 58. See Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 56, at 80 (“Recent experience suggests that monopolistic 
behavior may not always be eliminated by the market in a timely fashion, especially where powerful 
network effects are present.”). 
 59. Id. at 104–26 (arguing that Type I errors are not always worse than Type II errors and that 
whether liability rules should be calibrated to favor Type II errors depends on, inter alia, the likely 
durability of the resulting harms). 
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screening mechanisms for filtering out procompetitive behaviors require 
some adjustment.  The first two screens—the requirement that defendants 
possess market power and that the challenged conduct enhance their 
profits by reducing competition—have fared well and continue to enjoy 
support in the case law.60  The fifth—weeding out competitor 
complaints—remains useful in some contexts.  In challenges to horizontal 
mergers, for example, complaints by rivals should raise yellow flags, since 
competitors benefit from reduced competition and are injured when their 
rivals become more efficient.  Developments in economic learning, 
though, suggest that the mere fact that the complainant is a competitor does 
not always signal that the challenged practice is procompetitive.  We now 
understand that many exclusionary practices (e.g., exclusive dealing 
arrangements involving substantial market foreclosure) may injure 
competition by raising rivals’ costs.61  Because such practices hurt both 
consumers and competitors, the fact that a competitor is complaining, 
standing alone, does not indicate that the challenged practice is 
procompetitive.  The fifth filter is thus useful in some situations but not 
others.  A useful revision would be to say that behaviors drawing 
competitor complaints but no consumer complaints is likely 
procompetitive. 
Easterbrook’s third and fourth filters have not stood the test of time.  
The third, which eliminates challenges to vertical restraints that are not in 
widespread use throughout the market at issue, rests on a premise that we 
now understand to be faulty.  According to Easterbrook, “[t]he rationale 
for this [widespread use] filter is that every one of the potentially anti-
competitive outcomes of vertical arrangements depends on the uniformity 
of the practice.”62  We now know, though, that this is not true.  A dominant 
producer’s exclusive dealing contract that forecloses its rivals from a 
substantial proportion of sales opportunities and thereby holds them below 
minimum efficient scale can injure competition even if no other producers 
 
 60. With respect to the first (market power) filter, monopolization claims under Sherman Act 
Section 2 still require that the defendant possess monopoly power.  See Diaz Aviation Corp. v. Airport 
Aviation Servs., Inc., 716 F.3d 256, 265 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 
U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)).  And the existence of market power is typically required for liability based 
on concerted conduct that is not per se illegal.  See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 897 (2007) (observing that market power is necessary for anticompetitive harm, 
and thus liability, from RPM); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001) (assessing 
defendants’ market power in considering whether information exchange was illegal under the rule of 
reason).  The antitrust injury requirement helps implement the second filter, for it results in the 
dismissal of actions in which the complained of harm does not stem from a reduction in competition.  
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487–89 (1977). 
 61. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ 
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 254–58 (1986). 
 62. Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 30. 
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in the market engage in similar arrangements.63  A single firm’s tie-in that 
results in substantial foreclosure in the tied product market can similarly 
impair competition in that market.64  Even RPM, the vertical restraint 
Easterbrook referenced, can impair competition despite not being widely 
utilized.  For example, as the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., a dominant manufacturer 
can use RPM (with its guaranteed retail mark-up) to induce distributors to 
exclude rival brands, raising rivals’ distribution costs and potentially 
driving them below minimum efficient scale.65  And a dominant retailer 
can protect itself from being undersold by more efficient retailers by 
insisting that the producers whose brands it carries impose RPM.66  Neither 
of these types of anticompetitive harm from RPM requires that the practice 
be employed by all or most of the producers in a market. 
Easterbrook’s fourth filter—which screens out actions against 
defendants whose output and market share are not dropping—is similarly 
problematic.  This screen may be appropriate when the alleged 
anticompetitive harm is collusion—some kind of agreement to restrain 
output so as to increase price and enhance profits.  But if the defendant has 
engaged in unreasonably exclusionary conduct to drive rivals from the 
market or raise their costs, it will grow its market share and may well see 
its output rise as well, particularly if market demand is increasing.  Thus, 
in actions alleging unreasonably exclusionary conduct, courts should not 
dismiss claims solely because the defendant’s market share and output are 
rising. 
II. FOUR ADDITIONAL SCREENS FOR THE CURRENT ERA 
In addition to softening Easterbrook’s incommensurate harms 
principle and revising or eliminating some of his particular screening 
mechanisms, courts attempting to optimize antitrust’s effectiveness in the 
current antitrust moment should adopt four additional screens.  Although 
the first of these was implicit in Easterbrook’s analysis, he did not spell it 
out explicitly, likely for reasons discussed below.  The remaining screens 
differ somewhat from Easterbrook’s original filters in that they are not 
aimed at discerning whether challenged conduct is procompetitive or 
anticompetitive but are instead designed to ensure that antitrust 
intervention is likely to be welfare-enhancing.  They thus reflect 
 
 63. See Wright, supra note 57, at 1166–71 (discussing economics of market foreclosure). 
 64. See Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and Bundled Discounting, 72 
OHIO ST. L.J. 909, 922–23 (2011); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the 
Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 413–14 (2009). 
 65. 551 U.S. at 893–94. 
 66. Id. 
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Easterbrook’s well-founded concern about Type I error costs. 
A. Does the Challenged Practice Entail Consumer Harm? 
An initial twenty-first century filter—no imposition of antitrust 
liability absent consumer harm—would not have seemed worth 
mentioning when Easterbrook authored his 1984 article.  In Robert Bork’s 
influential 1978 book, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself, 
Bork purported to show that the purpose of the Sherman Act—as revealed 
in its legislative history—was to enhance consumer welfare, which Bork 
equated with maximizing efficiency (or, more specifically, minimizing the 
sum of allocative and productive inefficiencies).67  While Bork’s reading 
of legislative history has been severely questioned—if not discredited68—
his effort to focus the antitrust laws on consumer welfare met with success.  
In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed the antitrust laws to be a 
“consumer welfare prescription,”69 and ever since, the prevailing view 
among courts has been that antitrust’s sole end is consumer welfare, a view 
known as the “consumer welfare standard” (CWS).70  It is thus no surprise 
that in 1984, Easterbrook did not propose a screening mechanism to weed 
out antitrust actions aimed at some other objective besides consumer 
welfare. 
Times have changed.  Today, numerous commentators contend that 
the CWS prevents antitrust from remedying significant social harms that 
it could—and historically did—address.71  One such harm, these 
 
 67. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50–89, 116–
29 (1st ed. 1978). 
 68. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989) 
(observing that “Bork’s analysis of the legislative history was strained [and] heavily governed by his 
own ideological agenda” and that “[n]ot a single statement in the legislative history comes close to 
stating the conclusions that Bork drew”); Robert Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 150 (1982) 
(examining antitrust legislative history and concluding that Congress’s primary concern was not 
allocative efficiency but rather wealth transfers away from consumers and to monopolists); Tim Wu, 
After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The “Protection of Competition” Standard in Practice, 
ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018, at 1, 4, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/CPI-Wu.pdf [hereinafter Wu, After Consumer Welfare].  
 69. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting BORK, supra note 67, at 66). 
 70. Kenneth Heyer, Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork, 57 J.L. & ECON. S19, S32 
(2014) (“On the question of welfare standards for antitrust, however, it is harder to dispute the fact 
that Bork not only won the battle, he also won the war.”). 
 71. See generally WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 7; Wu, After Consumer Welfare, supra 
note 68 (arguing for the adoption of a “protection of competition” standard in lieu of the consumer 
welfare standard); see also Lina M. Kahn, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 737 (2017) 
(“[T]he undue focus on consumer welfare is misguided.  It betrays legislative history, which reveals 
that Congress passed antitrust laws to promote a host of political economic ends—including our 
interests as workers, producers, entrepreneurs, and citizens.”); MARSHALL STEINBAUM & MAURICE E. 
STUCKE, ROOSEVELT INST., THE EFFECTIVE COMPETITION STANDARD: A NEW STANDARD FOR 
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commentators say, is buyer market power.72  When purchasers of labor or 
inputs face little competition from other potential buyers, they can drive 
wages down and input prices below competitive levels.  This not only 
harms laborers and input sellers, but it also results in allocative 
inefficiencies as high-quality laborers and input providers, denied 
competitive prices, cut back on their offerings or divert them to less-
valuable uses.  These social harms do not register under the CWS—
according to critics of the standard—because driving prices of labor and 
other inputs below competitive levels does tend to lower output prices, 
providing an immediate benefit to consumers.73 
CWS critics also assert that the standard is incapable of addressing 
innovation harms that, unlike higher prices, are difficult to quantify and 
prove.74  They say that dominant technology platforms like Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, and Apple threaten innovation for a number of 
reasons.75  Their efficiencies have driven out small businesses, which tend 
to be particularly inventive.76  Operating in highly concentrated markets, 
these dominant firms face little pressure to innovate so as to avoid losing 
business to rivals.  And they are well-positioned to cut back on their own 
inventive efforts and either usurp others’ innovations or buy out the 
innovators at paltry prices.77  Because they collect extensive data on their 
 
ANTITRUST 1 (2018), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/The-Effective 
-Competition-Standard-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XG6-DHX5] (“The consumer welfare standard 
fails to define ‘welfare’ and ignores adverse effects on workers, suppliers, quality, and innovation.  It 
is not only ambiguous, but it is also inadequate to the task of preserving competition throughout the 
supply chain, in the labor market, and in the economy as a whole.”).  
 72. See, e.g., José Azar, Ioana Marinescu & Marshall I. Steinbaum, Labor Market Concentration 
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24147, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers 
/w24147.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LAD-YUSN]; Carl T. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse 
of Bigness and the Failure of Antitrust, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 10 (2015).  
 73. See, e.g., MARSHALL STEINBAUM, ERIC HARRIS BERNSTEIN & JOHN STURM, ROOSEVELT 
INST., POWERLESS: HOW LAX ANTITRUST AND CONCENTRATED MARKET POWER RIG THE ECONOMY 
AGAINST AMERICAN WORKERS, CONSUMERS, AND COMMUNITIES 32 (2018), https://rooseveltinstitute 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Powerless.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EM9-H2EB] (“[C]onsumer 
welfare paradigm ignores upstream ‘monopsony’—the power a firm can wield over its suppliers, 
including suppliers of labor . . . .”).   
 74. Id. at 26–29.   
 75. See id. at 7–8 (“In many instances, technological developments—free of regulatory 
oversight—have exacerbated these problems, allowed companies like Google, Facebook, and Amazon 
to achieve market dominance by collecting reams of data and acting as an all-knowing middleman 
between customers and upstream suppliers.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Barry C. Lynn & Phillip Longman, Who Broke America’s Jobs Machine? Why 
Creeping Consolidation Is Crushing American Livelihoods., WASH. MONTHLY (2010), 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1003.lynn-longman.html [https://perma.cc/8BBQ 
-B6DY] (“It is . . . widely agreed that small businesses tend to be more inventive, producing more 
patents per employee, for example, than do larger firms.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Steinbaum, Bernstein & Sturm, supra note 73, at 7–8 (“[R]ather than investing in 
research and development (R&D) to generate innovative products, corporations have relied on lax 
merger regulation to buy out competitors, or they have employed a litany of anticompetitive practices 
to prevent them from entering markets in the first place.”). 
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users’ Internet activity—both on and off their platforms—they can 
identify what innovations are most valuable and pursue only those 
opportunities.78  If the valuable innovations are not subject to intellectual 
property protections, they can simply copy them; or, if copying is illegal 
or infeasible, they can purchase the innovator.79  Many times, they can 
gain bargaining leverage over a buyout target by threatening to 
disadvantage the innovator’s offering on their own platforms (e.g., by 
making it less visible to platform users, hiding favorable reviews, etc.).80  
These factors, CWS critics say, have collectively created a “kill zone” in 
which venture capitalists will not invest out of fear that any valuable 
innovations will be appropriated or purchased on the cheap.81 
The concern that the CWS cannot address innovation harms is a subset 
of the broader concern that it is incapable of policing anticompetitive harm 
in zero-price markets.82  Because antitrust enforcement occurs in courts 
and not in expert regulatory agencies, evidence of consumer welfare 
effects must be accessible to and easily processed by juries and generalist, 
nonexpert judges.  As a practical matter, evidence concerning short-term 
price effects tends to be most salient to these factfinders.83  With firms like 
Facebook and Google, which allow consumers to access their services for 
free, showing consumer harm poses a challenge.  Even if a court adopts 
 
 78. See, e.g., Hal Singer, Inside Tech’s “Kill Zone”: How to Deal With the Threat to Edge 
Innovation Posed by Multi-Sided Platforms, PRO-MARKET (Nov. 21, 2018), https://promarket.org 
/inside-tech-kill-zone/ [https://perma.cc/C488-NUS4] [hereinafter Singer, Kill Zone] (“Dominant tech 
platforms can also exploit the vast amount of user data made available only to them by monitoring 
what their users do both on and off their platforms, and then appropriating the best-performing ideas, 
functionality, and non-patentable products pioneered by independent providers.”). 
 79. See, e.g., id. (discussing the trend in big tech for dominant firms to discriminate against, or 
vertically integrate with, innovative independent content providers); see also infra notes 80–81 and 
accompanying text. 
 80. See, e.g., Lina M. Kahn, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
973, 992 (2019) (“There are numerous means by which Amazon can disfavor any particular merchant: 
It can suspend or shut down accounts overnight, withhold merchant funds, change page displays, and 
throttle or block favorable reviews.”); Hal Singer, How to Stop Amazon from Swallowing the Internet, 
FORBES (Jan. 28, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2019/01/28/how-to 
-stop-amazon-from-swallowing-the-internet/#6b611fcc3664 [https://perma.cc/932F-TV8U].  
 81. See Singer, Kill Zone, supra note 78 (describing the “kill zone” as an area “around the tech 
giants in which startups are squashed”); see also Into the Danger Zone: American Tech Giants Are 
Making Life Tough for Startups, THE ECONOMIST (June 2, 2018), https://www.economist.com 
/business/2018/06/02/american-tech-giants-are-making-life-tough-for-startups [https://perma.cc 
/A3GP-GVJU] (“Venture capitalists . . . now talk of a ‘kill-zone’ around the giants.  Once a young 
firm enters, it can be extremely difficult to survive.  Tech giants try to squash startups by copying 
them, or they pay to scoop them up early to eliminate a threat.”).  
 82. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 
198 (2015) (“The narrow-minded focus on price competition exhibited throughout much of antitrust 
law’s developmental history has yielded analytical frameworks suited only for use in positive-price 
product markets.”). 
 83. See generally Kevin Caves & Hal Singer, When the Econometrician Shrugged: Identifying 
and Plugging Gaps in the Consumer-Welfare Standard, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 395 (2018) 
(discussing difficulty of proving and measuring non-price harms). 
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the view that consumers effectively pay for free services by providing the 
firms with valuable data, proving and quantifying an “overcharge” can be 
difficult.84 
CWS critics also assert that the standard’s focus on short-term price 
effects can immunize structural developments (high market concentration, 
etc.) that cause long-run consumer harm.85  Criticizing the CWS as applied 
to Amazon’s low pricing, for example, Lina Kahn writes: 
 Focusing primarily on price and output undermines effective antitrust 
enforcement by delaying intervention until market power is being 
actively exercised, and largely ignoring whether and how it is being 
acquired.  In other words, pegging anticompetitive harm to high prices 
and/or lower output—while disregarding the market structure and 
competitive process that give rise to this market power—restricts 
intervention to the moment when a company has already acquired 
sufficient dominance to distort competition.86 
Finally, a number of commentators—dubbed “Neo-Brandeisians” 
after Justice Louis Brandeis’s essay, A Curse of Bigness87—contend that 
the CWS prevents antitrust from addressing non-buyer/seller harms that 
result from having firms that are just too big.  For example, highly efficient 
giant businesses can eliminate less efficient smaller rivals that provide 
employment opportunities and are the lifeblood of many communities.88  
By generating massive profits for their managers and largest stockholders, 
giant businesses exacerbate wealth inequality.89  And because their 
economic might gives them excessive influence over government 
officials, their existence tends to undermine democratic values.90 
In light of the harms purportedly left unaddressed by the CWS—buyer 
market power, reduced innovation, harms in zero-price markets, long-term 
consumer harm from increased concentration, job losses, community 
impairment, wealth inequality, harm to democracy—many contemporary 
commentators contend that the CWS is myopic.91  They would not make 
 
 84. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 
49, 83–84 (2016) (discussing difficulty of assessing damages in zero-price markets).  
 85. See Kahn, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 71, at 738–39.   
 86. Id. at 738. 
 87. Louis D. Brandeis, A Curse of Bigness, HARPER’S WKLY., Jan. 10, 1914, at 18, 18.  See 
generally LOUIS. D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934).   
 88. See, e.g., Lynn & Longman, supra note 76. 
 89. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, Antitrust and Inequality: The Problem of Super-Firms, 63 
ANTITRUST BULL. 104, 109–10 (2018). 
 90. See generally WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS, supra note 7. 
 91. See, e.g., The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a Sea of 
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consumer harm a necessary condition to antitrust intervention and would 
replace the CWS with some sort of public interest approach that would 
permit antitrust intervention in the pursuit of other values.92 
Such a move would be misguided.  As an initial matter, jettisoning the 
CWS is unnecessary, as each of the aforementioned harms is either 
cognizable under the CWS or better addressed, if at all, by a body of law 
other than antitrust.93 
It is well established, for example, that the CWS reaches harms 
stemming from buyer market power.94  Properly understood, the standard 
focuses on harms not just to “final consumers” but also to trading parties 
on the other side of the market from the defendant.95  The term “consumer” 
is used in the CWS because most antitrust defendants are sellers accused 
of exercising market power to cause their buyers to pay an excessive price 
or accept inferior quality.  However, when a buyer possesses market power 
and exercises it to influence its suppliers, any diminution in prices paid to 
sellers is also considered “consumer” harm for purposes of the CWS.96  
Moreover, even if antitrust required harm to actual final consumers, 
exercises of buyer market power would still create cognizable harms: by 
artificially lowering input or labor prices, buyers exercising market power 
drive high-quality inputs and laborers from the market, reducing the 
quality of their output to the detriment of  final consumers.  Accordingly, 
 
Doubt?: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary: Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, & 
Consumer Rights, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Barry C. Lynn, Executive Director, Open Markets 
Institute); Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR. 
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 131, 132 (2018).  
 92. See K. Sabeel Rahman & Lina Kahn, Restoring Competition in the U.S. Economy, in 
UNTAMED: HOW TO CHECK CORPORATE, FINANCIAL, AND MONOPOLY POWER 18, 23 (Nell 
Abernathy, Mike Konczal & Kathryn Milani eds., 2016), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content 
/uploads/2016/06/Untamed-Final-Single-Pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/3C84-LMER]; Sen. Elizabeth 
Warren, Keynote Remarks at New America’s Open Markets Program Event: Reigniting Competition 
in the American Economy (June 29, 2016), https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/03/09/reigniting 
-competition-in-the-american-economy-june-29-2016/ [https://perma.cc/4BNF-VLAX] (expressing 
support for proposal “adopting a public interest standard for [antitrust] enforcement actions”). 
 93. See JOE KENNEDY, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., WHY THE CONSUMER WELFARE 
STANDARD SHOULD REMAIN THE BEDROCK OF ANTITRUST POLICY 9–17 (2018), https://docs.house 
.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20181212/108774/HHRG-115-JU05-20181212-SD004.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/QW56-JMNP].  
 94. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 583, 628–36 (2018) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust Movement] (explaining how 
CWS addresses buyer market power and labor market monopsony). 
 95. Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of 
Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2000–01 (2018) (“[A]pplying the ‘consumer welfare’ standard means that 
a merger is judged to be anticompetitive if it disrupts the competitive process and harms trading parties 
on the other side of the market.”); see also id. at 2001 n.14 (observing that trading partners “may be 
final consumers or businesses purchasing intermediate goods” or “suppliers such as workers or farmers 
who are harmed by the loss of competition when two large buyers merge”). 
 96. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Movement, supra note 94, at 634–35 (“For the purpose of 
analyzing wage suppression agreements, the worker stands in the same position on the sell side as the 
consumer does on the buy side.”).   
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a number of recent court decisions and enforcement actions, all purporting 
to implement the CWS, have invoked antitrust to prevent buyer market 
power.97 
Reduced innovation, non-price harms in zero-price markets, and 
adverse long-term effects on consumers are also cognizable under the 
CWS.  The consumer-welfare-focused Horizontal Merger Guidelines, for 
example, explicitly direct the antitrust enforcement agencies to consider 
potential innovation harms when evaluating proposed mergers,98 and the 
agencies regularly pursue cases on the basis of harms to innovation.99  
Non-price harms associated with free services are reachable under the 
CWS because all aspects of the transaction—price, quality, accompanying 
services, etc.—are relevant to the overall surplus consumers enjoy.100  For 
this reason, antitrust enforcers have recently affirmed that market power-
induced harms to consumer privacy, a matter of service quality, are 
cognizable under the CWS.101  And, of course, long-term adverse price 
 
 97. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing dismissal of antitrust 
claim based on employer information exchange that could have involved exercise of market power to 
suppress wages); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Six High 
Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24, 
2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop 
-entering-anticompetitive-employee [https://perma.cc/6PNK-3R59]; Jeff John Roberts, Tech Workers 
Will Get Average of $5,770 Under Final Anti-Poaching Settlement, FORTUNE (Sept. 3, 2015, 9:40 
AM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/03/koh-anti-poach-order/; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Justice Department Requires Knorr and Wabtec to Terminate Unlawful Agreements Not to Compete 
for Employees (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-knorr-and 
-wabtec-terminate-unlawful-agreements-not-compete [https://perma.cc/VX62-Y3CG].   
 98. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 6.4 
(2010) (agencies may consider whether a proposed merger is “likely to diminish innovation 
competition by encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level that would 
prevail in the absence of the merger”). 
 99. See Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Provides a More Reasonable Regulatory Framework Than 
Net Neutrality 11 (Geo. Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 17-35 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/abstractid=3020068 [https://perma.cc/F4RG-GH5K] (“Between 2004 and 2014, the FTC 
challenged 164 mergers and alleged harm to innovation in 54 of them.”).  
 100. In applying the CWS to abrogate the rule of per se illegality for minimum resale price 
maintenance (RPM), the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that the standard is not exclusively price-
focused.  See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–95 (2007).  While 
minimum RPM typically raises consumer prices, the Court observed that the practice is nevertheless 
frequently procompetitive because it induces services that consumers value by more than the 
incremental price increase.  Id. at 890–92, 895.  In other words, quality effects may trump price effects 
under the CWS. 
 101. The U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division recently explained: 
  The goal of antitrust law is to ensure that firms compete through superior pricing, 
innovation, or quality.  Price is therefore only one dimension of competition, and non-price 
factors like innovation and quality are especially important in zero-price markets.  
  Like other features that make a service appealing to a particular consumer, privacy is 
an important dimension of quality.  For example, robust competition can spur companies 
to offer more or better privacy protections.  Without competition, a dominant firm can more 
easily reduce quality—such as by decreasing privacy protections—without losing a 
significant number of users. 
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effects should always be part of the inquiry under the CWS; to the extent 
they have not been, the standard has been misapplied.102 
The non-buyer/seller harms emphasized by the Neo-Brandeisians—
job losses, community impairment, wealth inequality, harms to 
democracy—are better addressed by bodies of law other than antitrust, or 
perhaps left unremedied.103  Wealth inequality, for example, is better 
handled through tax and redistribution schemes;104 harms to democracy, 
by campaign finance rules and restrictions on lobbying (and, most 
fundamentally, by limiting government so that it cannot be used to procure 
private advantages for politically connected firms).105  Job losses and 
harms to communities from the failure of smaller, less efficient businesses 
may be somewhat mitigated by job-training programs, community 
investments, and the relocation of government agencies to economically 
depressed areas.106  At the end of the day, though, obsolescence is a 
consequence of economic development; there will always be some losses 
when new and better displaces old and less good.107  Using antitrust to 
protect economic laggards is sure to reduce welfare in the long run.108  In 
the end, then, none of the harms emphasized by CWS critics justifies 
abandoning the standard in favor of an approach that would pursue 
multiple goals. 
Not only is it unnecessary to abandon the CWS in favor of some sort 
of public interest standard, doing so would have adverse consequences for 
consumers and for the rule of law.  We know this from experience.  During 
the early- and mid-twentieth century, courts embraced multiple goals for 
antitrust.109  They often interpreted the law to promote consumer welfare 
by encouraging competition so as to lower prices and enhance quality.110  
But, in this effort to encourage competition, courts sometimes imposed 
liability in the absence of final-consumer harm—even in the face of 
 
Makan Delrahim, U.S. Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., “Blind[ing] Me With Science”: Antitrust, 
Data, and Digital Markets, Remarks at Harvard Law School & Competition Policy International 
Conference on “Challenges to Antitrust in a Changing Economy” (Nov. 8, 2019), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-harvard-
law-school-competition [https://perma.cc/47TL-DFV5]. 
 102. See Kennedy, supra note 93, at 9 (“[T]he consumer welfare standard allows regulators and 
courts to focus on long-term changes.  It just requires a sound economic analysis that shows the 
probability of market power at some later date.”). 
 103. Id. at 14–19. 
 104. Id. at 6.  
 105. Id. at 15–17. 
 106. Id. at 18–19. 
 107. Id. at 19. 
 108. Id. at 18–19. 
 109. See Joshua D. Wright, Elyse Dorsey, Jonathan Klick & Jan M. Rybnicek, Requiem for a 
Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 300–01 
(2019) (discussing multi-goaled approach of twentieth century antitrust). 
 110. Id. at 300. 
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obvious final-consumer benefit—simply to protect smaller firms from 
larger, more efficient rivals.111 
In Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., for example, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld a finding of harm to competition when Continental 
Baking, a large, efficient firm, entered a market and underpriced Utah Pie, 
a smaller but locally dominant rival.112  The Court did so even though the 
Utah Pie was able to cut its own prices, grow its output, and continue 
earning profits (albeit at lower margins) on each sale.113  Reinstating a jury 
verdict in favor of Utah Pie, which had been forced to cut its prices in 
response to Continental’s pricing strategies, the Court concluded that the 
jury could have found the requisite harm to competition because “a 
competitor who is forced to reduce his price to a new all-time low in a 
market of declining prices will in time feel the financial pinch and will be 
a less effective competitive force.”114  Thus, consumer concerns could be 
paramount in antitrust cases—unless the court decides to eschew 
consumer benefit to protect a less efficient rival. 
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,115 the Court all but admitted that 
it could pick and choose whether to put consumers or competitors first.  
Having conceded that the merger under review could enhance the merged 
firm’s productive efficiency, the Court wrote: 
Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain operations are 
beneficial to consumers.  Their expansion is not rendered unlawful by 
the mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely affected.  It 
is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects.  But we cannot 
fail to recognize Congress’ desire to promote competition through the 
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses.  Congress 
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the 
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.  It resolved these 
competing considerations in favor of decentralization.  We must give 
effect to that decision.116 
As Robert Bork aptly observed, “No matter how many times you read 
it, that passage states: Although mergers are not rendered unlawful by the 
mere fact that small independent stores may be adversely affected, we 
must recognize that mergers are unlawful when small independent stores 
 
 111. Id. (“[C]ourts viewed the role of antitrust as serving various—often conflicting and even 
anticompetitive—socio-political goals.”).  
 112. Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 687–89 (1967); see also id. at 698 
(describing Continental’s innovative method of processing fruit to make frozen pies). 
 113. Id. at 689–90. 
 114. Id. at 699–700. 
 115. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 116. Id. at 344. 
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may be adversely affected.”117  Under such an approach, a court could 
allow a merger that would benefit consumers by enhancing productive 
efficiency (if the court followed the second and third sentences in the 
passage above), or it could choose to block the merger (if it followed 
sentences four through seven).  Such leeway naturally trickled down to the 
enforcement agencies, which could then articulate grounds for challenging 
just about any businesses’ conduct by emphasizing its adverse effects on 
either consumers or competitors. 
With enforcers and courts free to pick and choose among antitrust’s 
multiple goals in order to condemn or acquit virtually any business 
behavior, antitrust became less a body of law and more an exercise of raw 
political power.  Bork compared it to the sheriff of a frontier town: “he did 
not sift the evidence, distinguish between suspects, and solve crimes, but 
merely walked the main street and every so often pistol-whipped a few 
people.”118  Even a U.S. Supreme Court justice admitted that antitrust had 
become arbitrary and unprincipled.  Dissenting in United States v. Von’s 
Grocery Co.—a decision that condemned a grocery store merger that 
generated obvious efficiencies and resulted in a merged firm with a paltry 
7.5% market share119—Justice Potter Stewart confessed: “The sole 
consistency that I can find is that in litigation under [Clayton Act Section] 
7, the Government always wins.”120 
When the government always wins, winning the favor of government 
officials becomes paramount.  For that reason, abandonment of the CWS 
in favor of a multi-goaled public interest standard would promote 
politicization of the antitrust enforcement agencies.121  It would also 
ensure that consumers, widely dispersed and difficult to organize, 
regularly lose out to firms and organized interest groups, even when the 
total harms to consumers from an enforcement decision exceed the 
benefits to the organized interests promoting it.  When the benefits of a 
government action are concentrated on a well-organized few while the 
costs are spread over a widely dispersed group, government officials tend 
to defer to the few over the many, even when the total benefits to the few 
are less than the total costs to the many.122 
 
 117. BORK, supra note 67, at 216. 
 118. Id. at 6.  
 119. 384 U.S. 270, 272–79 (1966).  
 120. Id. at 301 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 121. See Elyse Dorsey, Jan M. Rybnicek & Joshua D. Wright, Hipster Antitrust Meets Public 
Choice Economics: The Consumer Welfare Standard, Rule of Law, and Rent Seeking 3–7 (Geo. Mason 
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-20, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3165192 [https://perma.cc/6QJ8-ERC8]. 
 122. Id. at 4 (“Although such decisions result in net losses to society, private interests can 
successfully extract these rents because the benefits are concentrated among a small number of 
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A multi-goaled antitrust approach is not needed to address harms 
emphasized by CWS critics.  Adopting such an approach would politicize 
antitrust enforcement decisions and would likely reduce overall social 
welfare.  Courts should thus resist calls to jettison the CWS, and a 
demonstration of actual or likely consumer harm should remain a pre-
requisite to antitrust intervention. 
B. Has the Defendant Extended Market Power, or Just Exercised It to 
Extract Greater Surplus? 
Consumer harm from market power is a necessary, but insufficient, 
condition for antitrust intervention.  A second prerequisite to intervention 
should be an extension of market power by the defendant. 
Two types of antitrust-related business behavior can harm 
consumers.123  The first is an exercise of market power, which is the ability 
of a firm lacking competitive constraints to enhance its profits by raising 
its price above its incremental cost.124  When a firm exercises market 
power to charge supracompetitive prices, it extracts for itself more of the 
surplus, or wealth, created by its transactions with its customers.125  Firms 
 
organized individuals while the costs are diffused across numerous consumers who individually lack 
the incentive to organize and protect themselves.”).  
 123. See Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Extraction vs. Extension: The Basis for Formulating 
Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 285, 285 (2008).  
 124. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE 80 (3d ed. 2005) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY] (“Market 
power is a firm’s ability to deviate profitably from marginal cost pricing.”).  A firm competing in a 
market in which there are many good substitutes for the firm’s product will possess little market power; 
if it tries to raise price substantially above its incremental cost, it will lose sales to competitors who 
charge prices closer to their costs.  Competition will thus drive prices down near the level of cost.  Id. 
at 81.  An absence of suitable substitutes for a firm’s product, however, may enable the firm to enhance 
its profits by raising its price above its incremental cost.  Marginal consumers—those that attach the 
lowest value to the firm’s offering—may stop buying the product in response to the price increase.  
But consumers who attach a greater value to the product (infra-marginal consumers) will continue to 
buy it as long as the inflated price is less than the value they attach to the product and there is no 
competing product that offers them greater net value.  If the increased profits from consumers who 
continue to buy at the inflated price exceed the lost profits on foregone sales to marginal consumers, 
the price increase will be profitable.  The loss of value from transactions that would have occurred but 
for the price increase (i.e., from sales to marginal consumers) is an inefficiency—a “deadweight loss” 
in social welfare—occasioned by supracompetitive pricing.  See id. at 12–14, 19–20 (explaining 
monopoly pricing and deadweight loss). 
 125. Every voluntary transaction between a buyer and seller involves the creation of surplus 
(wealth), which is split between the buyer and seller.  The total surplus is the difference between the 
subjective value the buyer attaches to the thing being sold and the seller’s cost of producing and selling 
the item.  The seller’s surplus is the difference between the price the seller collects and the cost of 
making and selling the unit sold; the buyer’s is the amount by which she subjectively values the unit, 
less the price she must pay to obtain it.  See id. at 4–5.  Surplus “extraction” occurs when one party 
usurps for itself a greater proportion of the wealth created by the transaction with its counterparty.  See 
Carlton & Heyer, supra note 123, at 293–97.  
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may also cause consumer harm by extending their market power.126  When 
nominal competitors agree to act in concert to raise prices—e.g., in a naked 
price-fixing conspiracy—their collusive agreement creates market power 
that would not otherwise exist.  When two firms merge to create a 
monopoly, or in a manner that substantially increases the likelihood of 
future oligopolistic coordination, they similarly extend market power.  
When a firm engages in unreasonably exclusionary conduct that drives its 
rivals from the market or somehow raises their costs so as to render them 
less formidable competitors, its market power grows. 
While both surplus extraction and market power extension can 
occasion consumer harm, there should be no antitrust liability absent the 
latter.127  One reason for this is practical.  If surplus extraction involving 
no extension of market power were illegal, adjudicators and business 
planners would confront an intractable question: How much extraction is 
permitted?  Every instance of supracompetitive pricing by any firm with 
any quantum of market power transfers some surplus from consumers to 
the producer.128  It would be impracticable for antitrust to forbid all such 
surplus extraction, so courts would have to draw some sort of line.  Given 
the difficulty of doing so in any nonarbitrary fashion, courts have wisely 
ruled that the mere charging of monopoly prices is not an antitrust 
violation, despite the consumer harm from surplus extraction.129 
A more important reason for immunizing mere surplus extraction from 
antitrust liability is that doing so promotes dynamic efficiency.130  First, 
the prospect of earning supernormal profits due to a lack of competition 
motivates entrepreneurs to develop unique products and services.  As the 
U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged, “[t]he opportunity to charge 
monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business 
acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation 
and economic growth.”131 
In addition to motivating innovation, the supracompetitive profits 
 
 126. E.g., Carlton & Heyer, supra note 123, at 298 (describing market power extension).  Note 
that Carlton & Heyer are concerned solely with single-firm conduct that extends market power.  But 
collusion does so as well: Competitors as a group gain market power when they agree not to compete.  
 127. Id. at 293 (“[A]ntitrust policy could be simplified and, in our view, improved if conduct 
falling squarely into the extraction category was immune from antitrust attack.”). 
 128. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 19 
(2005) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE] (explaining how an exercise of 
market power transfers surplus from consumers to the producer). 
 129. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) 
(“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is 
not . . . unlawful . . . .”); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 447–48 (2009) 
(“Simply possessing monopoly power and charging monopoly prices does not violate § 2 [of the 
Sherman Act] . . . .”).  
 130. See Carlton & Heyer, supra note 123, at 287–88. 
 131. Verizon Commc’ns, 540 U.S. at 407. 
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gained through surplus extraction often enable innovation by funding 
research and development efforts.132  A glance at the top global spenders 
on research and development (R&D) reveals that most (eleven of fifteen) 
are either technology firms derided by many as monopolistic (#1 Amazon, 
#2 Alphabet/Google, #5 Intel, #6 Microsoft, #7 Apple, and #14 Facebook) 
or pharmaceutical companies whose patent protections insulate them from 
competition and allow them to charge supracompetitive prices for their 
products (#8 Roche, #9 Johnson & Johnson, #10 Merck, #12 Novartis, and 
#15 Pfizer).133  This should come as no surprise.  Firms that cannot extract 
surplus—those forced by competition to charge prices near incremental 
cost—have no money to spend on R&D.134  Because the static 
inefficiencies (deadweight losses) occasioned by mere surplus 
extraction135 may be dwarfed by the dynamic efficiencies that result from 
rewarding and financing innovation, antitrust should not forbid practices 
that extract surplus without also extending market power.136 
This runs counter to a number of recent proposals to condemn mere 
surplus extraction under the antitrust laws.  Harry First, for example, has 
argued that simple monopoly pricing may constitute an antitrust 
violation.137  Maintaining that “excessive pricing could satisfy the 
monopolistic conduct requirement” of Sherman Act Section 2,138 he 
contends that courts should impose antitrust liability on pharmaceutical 
companies solely on the basis of their excessive drug pricing.139 
 
 132. See PETER THIEL, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON STARTUPS, OR HOW TO BUILD THE FUTURE 33 
(2014) (“Monopolies drive progress because the promise of years or even decades of monopoly profits 
provides a powerful incentive to innovate.  Then monopolies can keep innovating because profits 
enable them to make the long-term plans and to finance the ambitious research projects that firms 
locked in competition can’t dream of.”).  
 133. Erin Duffin, Ranking of the 20 Companies with the Highest Spending on Research and 
Development in 2018, STATISTA (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/265645/ranking 
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/2JVF-HHUC].  
 134. Kennedy, supra note 93, at 12 (“Firms need to be able to obtain ‘Schumpertarian’ profits to 
reinvest in innovation that is both expensive and uncertain.”). 
 135. See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 124 and accompanying text 
(describing deadweight loss from supracompetitive pricing). 
 136. Carlton & Heyer, supra note 123, at 287 (“Rigorous measurements by economic scholars 
have demonstrated that investment and innovation are the dominant forces behind an economy’s 
advances in productivity and growth.”). 
 137. See generally Harry First, Excessive Drug Pricing As an Antitrust Violation, 82 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 701 (2019). 
 138. Id. at 711.  First asserts that “courts should reconsider the ready assumption that Section 2 
does not reach excessive pricing . . . because we do actually condemn high prices in many areas of 
antitrust law.”  Id. at 716.  In support of that claim, he points to authorities condemning price increases 
occasioned by cartels, anticompetitive mergers, and unreasonably exclusionary conduct.  Id.  Of 
course, in each of those situations the price increase accompanied conduct that extended market power 
(via combination, collusion, or exclusion).  First cites no case in which a court has condemned 
monopoly pricing absent some conduct extending market power. 
 139. Id. at 726–40. 
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Other commentators have raised antitrust concerns about algorithmic 
pricing systems in which digital platforms harness user data to estimate 
online purchasers’ willingness-to-pay and craft personalized prices.140  
Such price discrimination schemes extract additional surplus from 
consumers, but they do not extend sellers’ market power.  Compared to 
the situation in which a seller with market power charges a single 
supracompetitive price, personalized pricing may enhance total market 
output and reduce deadweight loss, as buyers who value the product by 
more than its incremental cost but less than the single supracompetitive 
price are brought into the market.141 
Commentators have also raised antitrust concerns about sharp 
business practices that, while perhaps unsavory (or even tortious), do not 
extend market power.  John Newman, for example, points to what he calls 
“digital blackmail.”142  That practice occurs when a digital platform 
manipulates the publication of information in order to extract value from 
some group of users.143  The platform may implicitly threaten either to 
publish “bad” or to suppress “good” information.144  Real estate 
comparison site Zillow allegedly engages in the former sort of digital 
blackmail; it publishes market value estimates of listed properties, but it 
will remove those that are below a listed property’s sale price (and thus 
have a depressive effect) in exchange for payments from the listing 
agent.145  Restaurant review site Yelp allegedly engages in the “suppress-
the-good” version of digital blackmail; it has purportedly threatened to 
remove or demote favorable reviews of restaurants that decline to purchase 
 
 140. See, e.g., JASON FURMAN ET AL., UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION: REPORT OF THE 
DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL 111 (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk 
/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_f
urman_review_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCW7-5F9G] (United Kingdom report on competition in 
digital platform markets) (“Concerns have been raised that the increasing availability of data and use 
of algorithms by businesses will enable them to personalise their product and service offerings.  At 
the extreme, personalised pricing could lead to each customer being offered an individual price based 
on what the business infers they are willing to pay.”); Morgan Wild & Marini Thorne, A Price of One’s 
Own: An Investigation Into Personalised Pricing in Essential Markets, CITIZENS ADVICE (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/Global/CitizensAdvice/Consumer%20publications/A%20price%2
0of%20one’s%20own%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3EV-AMBV].  
 141. See Carlton & Heyer, supra note 123, at 291 (“Antitrust hostility to [surplus-extractive price 
discrimination] is in some respects quite surprising from the perspective of an economist, given that 
simple monopoly pricing produces a clear and well-recognized static deadweight loss to the economy, 
while these other forms of unilateral conduct are believed frequently (though not always) to increase 
output, provide incentives for more effectively marketing a firm’s products, or otherwise enhance[e] 
welfare.”). 
 142. John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1535 (2019). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (“Digital blackmail can occur when a dominant platform extracts rents by displaying (or 
threatening to display) unwanted information, then charging victims for its removal or concealment.  
Digital blackmail may also involve the inverse strategy: threatening to remove desirable information, 
then charging victims for the ‘privilege’ of continuing to make it available.”). 
 145. Id. at 1536–37. 
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advertisements on its site.146  Both forms of digital blackmail would appear 
to involve significant business risk for the perpetrator.  By manipulating 
the information presented on their purportedly neutral sites, firms like 
Zillow and Yelp risk turning off users.  Rather than extending their market 
power, they threaten it by inviting competition from truly neutral rivals. 
 In the short term, each of the aforementioned behaviors may reduce 
consumer surplus and enhance the profits of the perpetrator.  Some 
instances might violate other provisions of law (e.g., prohibitions on 
deceptive trade practices) and could well merit condemnation on non-
antitrust grounds.  But none of the practices extend market power.  Given 
the impracticability of forbidding, and the dynamic efficiencies that result 
from allowing, mere surplus extraction, antitrust courts should follow 
Judge Learned Hand in embracing the maxim finis opus coronat—i.e., the 
end of the work is the crown.147  They should tolerate mere exercises of 
market power, reserving antitrust liability for behaviors that extend it. 
C. Does Another Body of Law or Some Sort of Private Ordering 
Adequately Address the Potential Anticompetitive Problem? 
A third screening mechanism for twenty-first century antitrust 
attempts to account for the law’s unique enforcement structure.  
Enforceable by private parties, the federal antitrust statutes entitle 
successful plaintiffs to treble damages.148  The rationale for damage-
trebling is that many antitrust violations—price-fixing conspiracies, etc.—
occur in secret and often are not detected and proven: if there is a one-third 
chance of getting caught, requiring the defendant to pay three times the 
damage caused will ensure optimal deterrence. 
But damage-trebling may lead to overdeterrence when the challenged 
behavior is (1) “mixed bag” (i.e., sometimes efficient and sometimes 
inefficient), so that it should not be universally deterred, and (2) not 
hidden, so that the likelihood that the conduct will be detected and proven 
is greater than one-in-three.149  Given the difficulty of parsing pro- from 
anti-competitive business conduct, mixed bag behavior is often wrongly 
 
 146. Id. at 1537. 
 147. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[A] strong 
argument can be made that, although the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the 
Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster: 
finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon 
when he wins.”). 
 148. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018). 
 149. See HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 128, at 67 (2005) (“Treble 
damages make no sense at all when they are assessed for public acts and reasonable minds can differ 
about substantive illegality.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 271–73 (2d ed. 2001) 
(acknowledging that mandatory trebling may over-deter and advocating that damages multiplier be 
adjusted to account for likelihood of concealment). 
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condemned.  If the behavior is open and notorious, it is certain to be 
detected.  Consider, then, a firm contemplating some pro-competitive, 
non-clandestine conduct that might create difficulties for its competitors 
and could therefore be wrongly condemned as anticompetitive.  The firm 
will engage in the contemplated conduct only if it would provide the firm 
with private benefits greater than three times the harm to its rivals, 
discounted by the likelihood of erroneous conviction.  The upshot is that 
many procompetitive instances of non-clandestine, mixed bag behavior 
will be wrongly deterred.150 
To account for potential overdeterrence resulting from trebling the 
damages occasioned by non-clandestine competitive conduct, antitrust 
should stay its hand when a potentially anticompetitive behavior occurs in 
the open and another body of law or some sort of contract is likely to 
prevent any anticompetitive harm the behavior may produce.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court appears to have endorsed this screening mechanism when 
some regulation would avert anticompetitive concerns.151  Courts should 
similarly limit antitrust’s reach when common law doctrines and privately 
ordered solutions are likely to prevent anticompetitive concerns without 
the distortive effects that may result from damage-trebling. 
Application of this filter would likely have prevented several recent 
enforcement actions against holders of standard essential patents (SEPs).  
When a patented technology is incorporated into a technology standard (so 
that the patent becomes “standard essential”), there is a risk that producers 
utilizing the standard (implementers) will invest extensively and then face 
unreasonable royalty demands from SEP-holders, who will know that the 
implementers cannot utilize a different technology without incurring 
exorbitant switching costs.152  To avert the risk of such “patent holdup,” 
standard setting organizations (SSOs) typically procure upfront 
 
 150. Suppose, for example, that the non-clandestine, procompetitive conduct under consideration 
by a firm would benefit it by $500,000 and consumers by $1.5 million but would cause rival harm of 
$1 million.  If there were a 25% chance of wrongful condemnation, the firm would not engage in the 
welfare-enhancing conduct.  Its expected liability of $750,000 ($3 million * 0.25) would exceed its 
expected gain.  Absent damage-trebling, which is unnecessary here to account for a lack of detection, 
the firm would engage in the conduct.  Its expected gain of $500,000 would exceed its expected 
liability of $250,000 ($1 million * 0.25). 
 151. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279–84 (2007) (declining 
to impose antitrust liability on the basis of initial public offering marketing practices that were 
arguably unreasonable restraints of trade because practices were regulated by federal securities laws 
and subject to active monitoring by Securities and Exchange Commission); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. 
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412–15 (2004) (refusing to impose antitrust duty to 
deal with rivals when telecommunications statute imposed analogous regulatory duties). 
 152. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1991, 1992–93 (2007) (discussing the problems of injunction threats and royalty stacking that 
results from multiple patents on one product).  See generally Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro 
& Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (2007) 
(discussing the threat of patent holdups). 
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commitments from potential SEP-holders that if their technology is 
included in the standard they will license it on fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.153 
In recent years, the federal enforcement agencies have occasionally 
concluded that antitrust should be used to police patent holdup, despite 
these privately ordered solutions.  For example, in separate actions against 
Bosch and Motorola (along with its acquirer, Google), the FTC took the 
position that a SEP-holder’s pursuit of injunctive relief amounts to an 
unfair method of competition.154  In In re Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC, 
the FTC reasoned that antitrust precludes a SEP-holder from seeking to 
renegotiate implementers’ royalty agreements.155  In the pending FTC v. 
Qualcomm Inc. case, which is currently on appeal, the FTC procured a 
district court ruling that a SEP-holder has an antitrust duty—apart from 
any FRAND commitment—to license its SEP to all its rivals if, at some 
point in the past, it has profitably licensed the patent to any rival.156 
In each of these cases, the allegedly anticompetitive behavior—pursuit 
of injunctive relief, attempted renegotiation of royalties, refusal to license 
to a rival—was not conducted in secret.  Each challenged behavior can be 
efficient: a holder of a FRAND-encumbered SEP might seek injunctive 
relief because the infringer is judgment-proof or has rejected (or expressed 
 
 153. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 46–47 (2007), 
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4YG-AEEM]; see also Jorge L. 
Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust 
Through a Historical Lens, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 39 n.3 (2015) (noting that FRAND (“fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory”) and RAND (“reasonable and non-discriminatory”) are 
interchangeable terms).  
 154. See Robert Bosch GmbH, No. C-4377, 2012 WL 5944820, at *3, *20 (F.T.C. Nov. 21, 2012); 
Motorola Mobility LLC, No. C-4410, 2013 WL 3944149, at *30–32 (F.T.C. July 23, 2013); see also 
Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Whither Symmetry? Antitrust Analysis of Intellectual 
Property Rights at the FTC and DOJ, 9 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 41, 46 (2013) (observing that the 
complaints and consent orders in Bosch and Motorola, “taken together, logically and necessarily 
depend upon the presumption that protecting a valid SEP against infringement by obtaining injunctive 
relief is itself anticompetitive.”).  The U.S. Department of Justice expressed a similar view about SEP-
holders’ pursuit of exclusion orders.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARD-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO 
VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 6 (2013) (withdrawn 2019) (endorsing the view that an 
exclusion order based on a SEP generally should not be granted because “[a] decision maker could 
conclude that the holder of a F/RAND-encumbered, standards-essential patent had attempted to use 
an exclusion order to pressure an implementer of a standard to accept more onerous licensing terms 
than the patent holder would be entitled to receive consistent with the F/RAND commitment.”).  This 
statement was withdrawn in 2019 and replaced with a new policy statement.  See U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICY 
STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND 
COMMITMENTS (2019). 
 155. See Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. C-4234, 2008 WL 4407246 (F.T.C. Sept. 22, 2008) 
(decision and order).  The FTC argued that Vertical Networks engaged in unfair practices when it 
attempted to break their licensing commitment.  See id. 
 156. 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 757–64 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
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the intent to reject) a FRAND royalty; a SEP-holder might legitimately 
renegotiate royalties in light of some market shift that undermines the 
original royalty rate; a SEP-holder could refuse to license to its direct 
rivals to prevent the sort of free-riding that diminishes incentives to 
innovate.  Finally, in each case, the alleged anticompetitive harm could 
have been addressed—with less distortion from potential treble damages 
actions—by another body of law: 
• Pursuit of Injunctions and Exclusion Orders.  Anticompetitive 
holdup from SEP-holders’ pursuit of injunctive relief or exclusion 
orders would be prevented by patent and tariff laws, both of which 
require the patent holder to establish that the requested relief is in 
the public interest.157  A SEP-holder that was just seeking to gain 
bargaining leverage to enhance its royalties—rather than seeking 
the injunction for a legitimate reason, such as the fact that the 
implementer was judgment-proof or had expressed an intention to 
reject a FRAND royalty—could not make such a showing.  
• Renegotiation Attempts.  The duress defense under contract law 
polices (by denying the enforceability of) renegotiations induced 
by the sort of economic pressure involved in a patent holdup 
situation.158  Yet, contract law permits good faith renegotiations—
the sort of renegotiation a SEP-holder might legitimately seek in 
light of a market shift that undermines the original royalty rate.159  
Contract law is thus fully capable of preventing anticompetitive 
holdup, while permitting reasonable renegotiations of SEP 
royalties. 
• Refusals to License to Rivals.  A SEP-holder’s obligation to license 
to its rivals can be—and routinely is—imposed by the FRAND 
commitment it makes to the SSO responsible for the technology 
standard.160  (Indeed, the Qualcomm court held that Qualcomm had 
 
 157. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (positing requirements 
for injunctive relief under patent act); see also J. Gregory Sidak, International Trade Commission 
Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of Standard-Essential Patents, 26 CORNELL J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 
125, 151–52 (2016) (discussing public-interest limitations on exclusion orders and noting that 
“Ambassador Froman found that, in this specific investigation, an exclusion order against Apple would 
adversely affect the U.S. economy’s competitive conditions and consumers”). 
 158. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175, 176 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(explaining when duress by threat renders a contract voidable and when a threat is improper); see also 
Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971) (recognizing defense of 
economic duress); Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102 (9th Cir. 1902) (invoking 
consideration doctrine to police economic duress resulting from holdup). 
 159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing for 
modifications of executory contract terms in certain situations). 
 160. See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Why Patent Hold-Up Does Not Violate Antitrust 
Law, 27 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2 (2019) (“[M]ost major SSOs require or urge all participants to 
disclose intellectual property rights and commit to license on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory 
(FRAND) terms.”). 
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a contractual duty to license its technology to rival chipmakers.161)  
As intended third-party beneficiaries of FRAND agreements, rivals 
may enforce them.162  Imposition of an antitrust duty to deals is thus 
unnecessary, is likely to impair the quality of contracts between 
SSOs and SEP-holders (why contract for a duty if a court is going 
to impose it under positive law?), and denies SEP-holders and 
SSOs the freedom to strike other bargains (e.g., limiting the duty to 
license in appropriate circumstances). 
When either another body of law or private ordering via contract is 
likely to avert competitive harm, the marginal benefit afforded by antitrust 
intervention will be low.  If the behavior at issue is not hidden, so that the 
likelihood of successful challenge is greater than one-in-three, antitrust 
will tend to over-deter by chilling borderline procompetitive conduct, 
which implies that the marginal cost of using antitrust to address the 
competitive harm will be relatively high.  In light of these low marginal 
benefits and high marginal costs, antitrust should stay its hand when 
another body of law would likely prevent competitive harms stemming 
from open and notorious behavior. 
D. Does the Contemplated Remedy Require an Excess of Particularized 
Knowledge or Endow Government Officials with a Great Deal of 
Discretionary Authority? 
A market failure, by itself, does not justify governmental intervention.  
Policymakers should also have confidence that a contemplated 
intervention will, not itself, impose losses greater than those stemming 
from the market failure.  This point is implicit in Easterbrook’s directive 
to craft antitrust policies that minimize the sum of error and decision costs: 
losses from improvident interventions are Type I (false conviction) error 
costs that must be balanced against the losses from allowing market power 
to persist Type II (error costs).163  A final screening mechanism, which 
should operate more as a guiding principle than a strict filter, highlights 
considerations that are particularly important in striking this balance. 
Just as markets may systematically fail under certain conditions (e.g., 
externalities, public goods, and market power), so may government 
interventions.164  Government failure is particularly likely in two 
circumstances.  First, as F.A. Hayek famously observed, when the 
 
 161. FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 751–58 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[T]he intended 
beneficiary [of a contract] may enforce the duty.”). 
 163. See Easterbrook, supra note 13, at 21.   
 164. See generally THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 
(2017) (examining systematic market and government failures). 
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contemplated intervention requires central planners to acquire and process 
troves of information that is widely dispersed among economic actors, 
losses are likely to occur as the planners, who cannot gather and process 
such information, misallocate productive resources away from their 
highest and best ends.165 
Second, losses are particularly likely when interventions endow 
government officials with great discretion over the allocation of 
productive resources.  As scholars associated with the “public choice” 
economic tradition have demonstrated, discretionary authority invites 
special interest manipulation of governmental power for private ends.166  
Rather than using their authority to maximize social welfare, government 
officials—who retain their rational, self-interested natures when acting in 
their official capacities—will frequently exercise state power in a manner 
that benefits them personally.167  Organized groups—often incumbent 
firms—will find ways to exploit this tendency in their favor (e.g., by 
lobbying officials or wooing them with the prospect of future 
employment).  The general public, which is injured by this special interest 
manipulation, typically will not exert a counterbalancing influence over 
government officials; because the costs of special interest manipulation 
are widely dispersed, individual members of the public do not have an 
adequate incentive to mount a response even if their losses, in the 
aggregate, exceed the benefits that are concentrated on the organized 
group(s).168 
In light of the Hayekian knowledge problem and public choice 
concerns, courts and enforcers should typically avoid antitrust 
interventions that either require a great deal of particularized knowledge 
or endow government officials with a large store of discretionary 
authority.  This general guideline calls into question a number of recent 
antitrust proposals. 
One such proposal is to treat the user data collected by digital 
 
 165. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524–25 (1945). 
 166. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962) (explaining that as government has 
grown, “the increased investment in organization aimed at securing differential gains by political 
means is a predictable result”).  For a succinct summary of the key insights of public choice, see 
William F. Shughart II, Public Choice, in DAVID R. HENDERSON, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS 427–30 (2008).  
 167. See Shughart, supra note 166, at 428 (“[P]ublic choice, like the economic model of rational 
behavior on which it rests, assumes that people are guided chiefly by their own self-interests and, more 
important, that the motivations of people in the political process are no different from those of people 
in the steak, housing, or car market.  They are the same human beings, after all.”). 
 168. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS 166–67 (8th ed. 1980). 
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platforms like an essential facility that must be made available to rivals.169  
In order to preserve the incentive to collect, store, and organize valuable 
data, firms subject to a sharing duty must receive some sort of 
compensation.  Moreover, because user data vary in both usefulness and 
difficulty of collection, the firms providing data to their rivals should be 
entitled to different compensation for different types and quantities of data.  
This means that a court imposing a duty to share data with rivals would 
have to create an elaborate price schedule that takes into account such 
information as the cost of collecting and organizing different sorts of data 
and the value each sort provides—information that is largely inaccessible 
and likely to change over time.  Courts are ill-equipped to gather and 
process all that information. 
The Hayekian knowledge problem also bedevils recent calls to break 
up the largest digital platforms—Google, Facebook, and Amazon.170  A 
breakup of any firm requires a tremendous amount of knowledge about the 
operation of the business and its various components, and the record on 
antitrust breakups is far from encouraging.171  Indeed, in a detailed analysis 
of seven major breakups under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, economist 
Robert Crandall concluded that only one—the 1984 breakup of AT&T—
increased industry output and lowered prices.172  That unimpressive record 
is for breakups of “old economy” firms that divided along natural fault 
lines.  Figuring out how to dissect highly integrated technology firms 
without causing consumer harm would be far more difficult. 
As Will Rinehart has observed, the leading digital platform firms 
utilize business models, teams, and technologies that greatly complicate 
 
 169. See, e.g., JASON FURMAN ET AL., supra note 140, at 74–76 (2019) (recommending “data 
openness as a tool to promote competition”); see also STIGLER CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECON. & 
THE STATE, STIGLER COMMITTEE ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS: FINAL REPORT 117 (2019) [hereinafter 
STIGLER CENTER REPORT] (“[D]ata [sharing] forms a very important remedy in the toolkit of . . . 
antitrust authority . . . .”); see also JACQUES CRÉMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE & HEIKE 
SCHWEITZER, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA 105–07 (2019) (“The sharing of data with 
competitors may then promote competition and innovation in the industry.”).  
 170. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 
2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c 
[https://perma.cc/SHW6-4W3A]. 
 171. See Will Rinehart, A History of Failure: Government-Imposed Corporate Breakups, AM. 
ACTION F. (June 27, 2018), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/a-history-of-failure 
-government-imposed-corporate-breakups/ [https://perma.cc/W55S-B84Z] (arguing that past 
breakups of companies including Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and AT&T “show how ineffective 
this method is at creating competitive markets”).  
 172. Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization 
Cases, 82–83 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg. Studies, Working Paper No. 01-05, 2001), https:// 
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03_monopoly_crandall.pdf [https://perma.cc/KER 
9-ZRH7].  Crandall observed that even the breakup of AT&T “turns out to be a case of overkill because 
the same results could have been obtained through a simple regulatory rule, obviating the need for 
vertical divestiture of AT&T.”  Id. at Executive Summary. 
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their division.173  With respect to business models, the firms operate 
multisided platforms where the value to users of one side (e.g., advertisers) 
is largely dependent on the number and intensity of users on the other side 
(e.g., individuals engaged in search or social networking).174  Moreover, 
the firms tend to engage in internal cross-subsidization, using revenues 
from one line of business (e.g., Google search) to support less profitable 
services (e.g., Google’s YouTube, which is widely assumed not to be 
profitable on its own).175  With multi-sided platform businesses engaged 
in extensive cross-subsidization, an adverse effect on one part of the 
business due to a government intervention can wreak havoc on other, 
seemingly unrelated lines of business.  To avoid consumer harm, a breakup 
plan would have to accurately account for a highly complex set of 
interrelationships. 
Breaking up the digital platforms is also complicated by the fact that 
they employ teams that work across the entire platform.176  Facebook’s 
software engineers, for example, support Facebook, Messenger, 
Instagram, and WhatsApp.177  Google uses common teams to support 
Google Search, YouTube, Gmail, and more obscure parts of Google’s 
business, such as the Google File System, Bigtable, Spanner, MapReduce, 
and Dremel.178  As Rinehart explains, “The result is a complex webbing of 
distinct yet clearly interconnected organizational divisions.  This webbing 
makes implementing a Standard Oil-style trust-busting effort difficult at 
best.”179 
Adding further complexity is the fact that the different parts of each 
digital platform utilize a common suite of technologies (referred to as the 
platform’s technology “stack”).180  Facebook’s stack, for example, 
includes a number of proprietary technologies designed to assist with 
common tasks engaged in by all its various services: “BigPipe” serves 
 
 173. Will Rinehart, Breaking Up Tech Companies Means Breaking Up Teams and The Underlying 
Technology, AM. ACTION F. (July 23, 2018), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/breaking 
-up-tech-means-breaking-up-technology-and-teams/ [https://perma.cc/RW6U-WWVW] [hereinafter 
Rinehart, Breaking Up Tech Companies].  
 174. See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 1 ISSUES 
COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 667, 670–71 (2008).  
 175. Rinehart, Breaking Up Tech Companies, supra note 173. 
 176. Id. (“Both companies rely upon flexible teams to solve problems that tend to cross the normal 
divisional and functional bounds.”).  
 177. Mike Isaac, Zuckerberg Plans to Integrate WhatsApp, Instagram and Facebook Messenger, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/technology/facebook-instagram 
-whatsapp-messenger.html [https://perma.cc/FD8Y-LNTF].  
 178. See Rinehart, Breaking Up Tech Companies, supra note 173; see also Why Breaking Up Big 
Tech Could Do More Harm Than Good, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 26, 2019), https:// 
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-breaking-up-big-tech-could-do-more-harm-than-good/ 
[https://perma.cc/4QMQ-6PTR]. 
 179. Rinehart, Breaking Up Tech Companies, supra note 173. 
 180. Id. 
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pages faster, “Haystack” stores “billions of photos efficiently,” “Unicorn” 
searches the social graph, “TAO” stores graph information, “Peregrine” 
assists with querying, and “MysteryMachine” helps with performance 
analysis.181  Facebook has also invested billions of dollars in data centers 
designed to deliver video quickly, and it installed (with Microsoft) an 
undersea cable to speed up information transmission.182  Google has 
similarly developed a suite of technologies that are commonly used by its 
various business units.183  As Rinehart observes, this technical integration 
of the digital platforms raises a vexing question: “Where do you cut these 
technologies when splitting up the compan[ies]?”184  Mistakes in 
technological disintegration are likely to decrease productive efficiencies 
substantially.  As Wordsworth put it, “[w]e murder to dissect.”185 
Whereas proposals to treat user data as an essential facility and to 
break up major digital platforms involve significant knowledge problems, 
other recent antitrust proposals would endow government officials with 
significant discretionary authority and thus raise public choice concerns.  
One such proposal, discussed above, is to jettison the relatively cabined 
consumer welfare standard in favor of a more amorphous public interest 
standard.186  Another proposal is to create a federal agency with broad 
powers to regulate digital platforms.187  A third proposal is aimed at 
stemming anticompetitive harms from institutional investors’ common 
ownership of the stock of competing firms.188 
Responding to claims that horizontal shareholding has increased 
prices by diminishing the incentive of commonly held firms to compete 
with each other, Eric Posner, Fiona Scott Morton, and Glen Weyl have 
proposed that the FTC and DOJ adopt an enforcement policy that would 
encourage institutional investors to avoid intra-industry diversification in 
concentrated industries that are susceptible to oligopolistic pricing.189  
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (describing Google’s technology stack and back-end integration). 
 184. Id. 
 185. William Wordsworth, The Tables Turned; An Evening Scene, on the Same Subject, in 
WILLIAM WORDSWORTH & SAMUEL T. COLERIDGE, LYRICAL BALLADS, WITH A FEW OTHER POEMS 
(1798) (“Our meddling intellect / Mis-shapes the beauteous form of things; / —We murder to 
dissect.”). 
 186. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.   
 187. See Neil Chilson, Creating a New Federal Agency to Regulate Big Tech Would Be a Disaster, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/10/30 
/creating-new-federal-agency-regulate-big-tech-would-be-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/937L-ALGD].  
Neil Chilson was responding to a proposal by the University of Chicago’s Stigler Center for the 
creation of a new federal Digital Authority.  See STIGLER CENTER REPORT, supra note 169, at 100–
19.  
 188. See Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the 
Anticompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 669–70 (2017). 
 189. Id. 
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Under the proposed policy, the agencies would annually compile a list of 
oligopolistic industries.190  Investors in such industries could avoid 
antitrust liability by holding less than one percent of total industry equity 
or, if they held more than that amount, by holding stock of only one firm 
per industry.191 
Because the term oligopoly (unlike “market” in the antitrust context) 
lacks any agreed-upon meaning, agency officials would have wide 
discretion in determining what industries made the list.192  Moreover, 
designation as an official oligopoly could have significant consequences 
beyond the context of common ownership.  As Michael Sykuta and I have 
elsewhere detailed, Posner et al.’s proposal, which would move the FTC 
and DOJ out of their traditional role as ex post law enforcers and in the 
direction of ex ante regulators, would create significant public choice 
concerns: 
If the agencies were to designate entire industries as oligopolistic . . . 
interest groups would almost certainly join the fray.  Having their 
industry designated oligopolistic would raise the antitrust risk firms face 
from all sorts of practices. . . .  In light of this enhanced antitrust risk (not 
to mention the risk that official designation as an oligopoly could spark 
direct regulation), industry participants could be expected to mount a 
vigorous opposition to any attempt to designate their industry as 
oligopolistic.  At the same time, groups with an interest in heightened 
antitrust scrutiny within an industry—e.g., consumer groups, vertically 
related firms that could benefit from greater restriction on industry 
participants—would invest resources to secure the industry’s inclusion 
on the list of oligopolies.  Indeed, the proposal by Posner et al. invites 
interest group involvement (and the social costs associated therewith) by 
specifying that “[t]here would be some mechanism to solicit comments 
from any interested parties.”193 
None of this is to say, of course, that antitrust interventions should 
 
 190. The proposed enforcement policy contemplates that:  
Prior to the start of each calendar year, the DOJ and FTC would make a list of industries 
constituting oligopolies . . . .  There would be some mechanism to solicit comments from 
any interested parties.  The DOJ and FTC would then finalize the list with at least a month 
before the beginning of the new year to allow the institutional investors time to rearrange 
their holdings to comply with the policy.  
Id. at 708–09.  
 191. Id. at 678.  
 192. Thomas A. Lambert & Michael E. Sykuta, The Case for Doing Nothing About Institutional 
Investors’ Common Ownership of Small Stakes in Competing Firms, 13 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 213, 260 
(2019) (“The term ‘industry’ . . . has no . . . economically informed, tractable definition . . . .  
Moreover, once an industry is defined, there will have to be criteria for declaring it to be 
oligopolistic.”). 
 193. Id. at 260–61 (quoting Posner et al., supra note 188, at 709).  
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never involve complicated fact-finding or confer discretionary authority 
on government officials.  As noted, this final screening mechanism is more 
a guideline than a strict filter.  But just as antitrust courts learn from 
experience with business practices and adjust presumptions accordingly, 
courts and policymakers should do the same with experiences of 
government practices.  Because experience has shown that interventions 
are especially likely to misfire when they entail high knowledge 
requirements or excessive discretion, such interventions should be 
examined under a (rebuttable) presumption of error. 
CONCLUSION 
As Dan Crane has observed, “[a]ntitrust law stands at its most fluid 
and negotiable moment in a generation.”194  Popular commentators and 
scholars alike are questioning such seemingly settled doctrines as the 
consumer welfare standard.  Widespread discontent with various social 
conditions—from economic inequality, to political polarization, to 
concerns about data privacy—has generated calls for antitrust to do more. 
But antitrust remains a fundamentally limited enterprise, as Judge 
Easterbrook famously observed.195  While a few of Easterbrook’s specific 
suggestions require adjustment in light of market developments and 
advances in economic learning, his overarching directive, and several of 
his proposed screening mechanisms, remain sound. 
As courts and enforcers confront an ever-growing chorus calling for 
bigger and bolder antitrust, they would do well to embrace Easterbrook’s 
general model, revise some specifics, and supplement it with four 
additional filters that limit antitrust’s reach.  In particular, they should limit 
interventions to instances of consumer harm arising from behavior that 
extends market power, where no other body of law or instance of private 
ordering is likely to prevent the harms at issue with less distortive effect, 
and the remedy imposed does not entail excessive knowledge 
requirements or conferral of discretionary governmental authority.  Such 
an approach may disappoint those who imagine that antitrust can solve a 
host of social problems, but it alone will ensure that twenty-first century 
antitrust actually succeeds at the things antitrust in fact does well. 
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 195. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 13.  
